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I. INTRODUCTION
I have been asked to glean a few lessons from the environmen-
tal experience that have general application to the negotiation and
mediation of complex issues. That assignment is somewhat dif-
ficult because the environmental movement started less than two
decades ago. That short history has been characterized by inequali-
ty of power, distrust, and polarized positions - all being factors
that are not conducive to negotiated settlements. Nevertheless, a
successful environmental mediation movement has emerged in the
United States, and its exponents claim substantive success. Gail
Bingham, a prominent environmental mediator, notes in her forth-
coming treatise that 160 major environmental disputes have been
mediated during the last decade, and there are now environmen-
tal mediation services available in 13 states, the District of Col-
umbia, and Canada.'
Significant limitations apply to these dispute resolution ap-
proaches. I believe thai an understanding of these-limitations will
lead to a better appreciation of the notable successes of dispute
resolution efforts. An appropriate beginning may be to discuss
these limitations. The initial limitation is the myth that alternative
methods are always easier than conventional resolution methods,
and that all controversies can be settled outside of the courthous
Finally, the history of the environmental movement presents
special problems for a process that is based on mutual trust.
II. ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTES SUSCEPTIBLE TO MEDIATION
Many individuals misperceive negotiation and mediation as
substitutes for litigation. This belief has led to the frustration of
many a sanguine negotiator because basic fallacies underlie that
premise. Contrary to popular theory, litigation may often b e more
time and cost efficient than negotiation for the resolution of public
*The author is a member of the New York Bar and the firm of Sive, Paget & Riesel, P.C. of New
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disputes. Endless convocations of parties with doubtful mandates
that may achieve questionable understandings are not necessarily
a superior method to the final judicial resolution of an issue.
The parties may never reach the negotiating table unless litiga-
tion reveals that without negotiation the resolution of problems
will be delegated to a disinterested third party.
Aside from a disinclination to have important matters taken
out of one's control, a further motivating factor for using tradi-
tional dispute resolution is that the balance of power, or at least
the perception of that balance, can be altered through litigation.
This is frequently recognized in environmental disputes. Some ex-
amples may illustrate this point. First, a non-negotiating developer
may become an earnest negotiator after a critical permit has been
judicially remanded to the permitting agency as the result of a suc-
cessful lawsuit. Similarly, an industrial waste discharger who has
spurned the government's efforts to resolve a dispute will become
amenable to a negotiated settlement once the government has
demonstrated its resolve to protect the public interest by vigorous-
ly pursuing enforcement litigation.
Public disputes involving environmental issues create unique
problems for negotiation. Government agencies can be extremely
resistant to meaningful negotiation. The agencies are often in-
capable of responsible negotiation due to their bureaucratic struc-
tures which diffuse responsibility. Public agencies are often not
responsive to relatively unorganized public interest groups
because their responsibility is to establish political power. In en-
vironmental disputes, the public interest is often advanced by ad
hoc citizens' groups with little established political power. Litiga-
tions resulting in media attention or procedural victories allows
these groups to acquire the requisite status to warrant the agen-
cies' meaningful attention.
Environmental disputes are usually between established
organizations with substantial resources and ad hoc organizations
whose power arises from protest and confrontation. These ad hoc
groups may only achieve status sufficient to trigger meaningful
negotiations once they have obtained recognition through litiga-
tion. In these situations, the power relationship is temporal. The
ad hoc organization would lose 'its power if it entered into negotia-
tions too quickly. Therefore, these groups can negotiate fairly in
the context of some adversarial proceeding.
The mastery of facts and applicable procedural constraints is
no less demanding in the negotiating context than it is in litiga-
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tion. To the extent that potential negotiators ignore this principle
they court disaster. In many forms of litigation, factual ignorance
can be masked behind formal and procedural facades. There are
no such protections when the parties face each other across the
negotiating table. Environmental disputes tend to have complex
factual predicates, and the failure of the parties to master the facts
leads to misunderstanding and failure. Negotiation of such
disputes does allow the parties to dispense with the formalities
associated with litigations and to concentrate their energies on the
difficult factual questions.
III. CERTAIN DISPUTES ARE NOT SUSCEPTIBLE TO ALTERNATE METHODS
There are certain types of environmental controversies that do
not lend themselves to negotiation and mediation. These contrdver-
sies are important because environmental, governmental, ot in-
dustrial interest groups may decide that the environmental impact,
precedential value or symbolism of the dispute justify the expense
and effort of a courtroom confrontation. Many environmental
disputes thus have importance to adversaries far beyond the im-
mediate resolution of the present dispute. This is particularly true
in environmental areas where a judicial resolution of a particular
dispute is desired for its effect on the developing law. Similar
analogies appear in other fields. For example, management in the
labor field may position itself to withstand a strike because it is
more important to convey a long-term message than to negotiate
an immediate but temporary resolution.
Certain environmental disputes do not lend themselves to a
negotiated resolution for a number of reasons. Foremost is the in-
equality of power between interested parties. A negotiated solu-
tion is not likely when one side has the power to achieve uni-
laterally its objectives without substantial cost. A variation on this
theme occurs when a party believes that a resolution is not
desirable because that party thinks it benefits from the passage
of time. This is not an uncommon situation in many environmen-
tal disputes.
It appears that a substantial number of environmental disputes
are appropriate for mediation. This fact is evidenced by the increas-
ing prominence of dispute resolution methods in environmental
affairs.2 These efforts have and are continuing to succeed in a
2. Bingham notes:
In addition, and relatively recently. the practice of environmental dispute resolution has
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field characterized by distrust, opposing views, and rhetoric that
exacerbates the controversy.
IV. THE EMERGENCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES
If mediation and negotiation have gained a foothold in the en-
vironmental field, these same processes may thrive in other areas.
To understand this contention, I would ask you to review the
history of the environmental movement. Although Americans have
been actively concerned about the environment since the days of
Theodore Roosevelt and Gifford Pinchot, the modern environmen-
tal movement arose out of an almost revolutionary awareness that
we had been despoiling our own nest for too long. Early efforts that
were made at conserving our natural resources were forgotten as
the United States moved through the Second World War, the Cold
War, and industrial expansion. However, in the 1960s the public
became aware of the problematic situation created by our in-
dustrial expansion and movement towards consumer orientation.
This awareness can be traced to three interesting phenomena.
The first is Rachael Carson's publication of her book Silent
Spring3 in 1962. By reading this book, Americans became aware
that they had poisoned the environment with DDT, and more im-
portantly, that something fundamental had gone wrong. The sec-
ond event was the public and judicial fight over Storm King Moun-
tain. This incident gave more shape to the forthcoming battles over
the environment than any other single controversy. Storm King
Mountain dominates the gorge of the Hudson River Valley, which
is one of the great natural beauties of America. In 1962, Con-
solidated Edison (Con Edison), a New York public utility, decid-
ed to build an electric generating facility on the face of the moun-
tain. The affluent members of the Hudson River Valley communi-
ty banded together to attack the proposed project. The forum that
gave these conservationists their penultimate victory was the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. 4 This
grown beyond the resolution of disputes on a case-by-case basis to the institutionaliza-
tion, by statute, of procedures for resolving environmental disputes. Statutes in
Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Virginia. and Wisconsin authorize or even require negotia-
tion of hazardous waste facility siting disputes. A statute in Virginia specifies procedures
for negotiation and mediation of intergovernmental disputes triggered by annexation
proposals; in mid-1984, the Pennsylvania legislature was considering a bill that would
authorize mediation of any local land use or zoning dispute.
Id. Executive Summary at 3.
3. R. CARSON. SILENT SPRING (1962).
4. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Comm'n, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir.
1965); 453 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1971).
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historic victory obtained by these litigants forced administrative
agencies to take into account environmental factors when
evaluating proposed projects. The third event was the series of bat-
tles that arose from efforts to dam the free flowing western
rivers.5 These efforts were fought in the media, the halls of Con-
gress, and the courts.
In the 1960s, environmental groups that were originally
private regional clubs sought to obtain power by transforming
themselves into national organizations that could influence deci-
sions through dominance of the media, increased political activi-
ty, and lawsuits. The quest for the power necessary to influence
environmental decisions triggered a hostile reaction from the
political, bureaucratic, and corporate establishments. The
establishments' arrogant reaction to these early environmental ef-
forts, caused by their lack of sensitivity to this revolutionary move-
ment, actually increased the power of the new environmentalists.
The concomitant loss of power was not accepted graciously
because the establishment believed that their power to control en-
vironmental decisions had eroded due to the environmentalists'
unfair manipulation of the media, cavalier treatment of facts, and
marked tendency to disregard the scientific processes. Accordingly,
an aspect of the late 1960s and the early 1970s was a lingering
distrust between the environmentalists, the regulated communi-
ty, and the bureaucracy.
Before mutual confidence could become a reality, the political
process began to take on a life of its own. Senator Edmund Muskie
ushered the Clean Air Act through Congress in 1970. By the end
of the decade, the country had a number of comprehensive en-
vironmental statutes6 and a massive environmental bureaucracy
to protect the interests espoused by earlier conservationists.
Legislation created new vested interests and accompanying suspi-
cions. By the late 1970s, a semblance of understanding and
cooperation began to develop between the various elements.
However, in 1980 the Reagan Administration, working under the
impression that American society did not have a strong concern
for the environment, began to destabilize this new relationship. The
Administration's attempt to weaken the environmental agencies
and to roll back the environmental standards has revived many
5. Sea eg., Udall v. Federal Power Comm'n, 387 U.S. 428 (1967).
6. See, eg., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§7401-76 (1982); Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§6901-6987 (1982); Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and
Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§9601-9657 (1982): Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§1251-1376 (1982).
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feelings of distrust and animosity.
Despite the rhetoric associated with years of vigorous en-
vironmental controversies, some rudimentary form of compromise
the essential ingredient of mediated disputes, has long been an
aspect of the environmental process. For example, an applicant for
a wastewater discharge permit will tailor that permit's parameters
to an understanding that has evolved from the informal give and
take between the applicant and the administrative agency
regulating such discharges. Similarly, a developer will tend to
shape a proposed project to the articulated demands of communi-
ty opponents.
Professional mediators in the environmental area have
benefited from the natural tendency of parties to compromise,
which may be a more predominate factor than the attendant
rhetoric. Environmental mediators have obtained a fair degree of
success because they have had the ability to diffuse strong feel-
ings and persuade parties that mutual benefits can be achieved
despite their heritage of distrust.
V. Two ILLUSTRATIVE ENVIRONMENTAL MEDIATIONS
I would like to examine two environmental mediations that are
useful as illustrative studies. One is the mediation that settled the
Storm King dispute. The second is the Westway mediation which
failed.7
I have already alluded to the Storm King dispute. The Westway
dispute concerned New York's crumbling road structure and a
crumbling mass transit structure, both of which compete for
federal funds. These transportation interests clashed over efforts
to build a massive interstate highway (Westway) along Manhat-
tan's Hudson River. Development of Westway has been supported
by real estate interests, government officials interested in road
transportation, and certain organizations that believe a good road
network is needed to support growth. Westway has long been bit-
terly opposed by environmentalists. The anti-Westway groups con-
tend there might be a need for a better road, but not the massive
road contemplated by the proposal. These groups alleged that
money earmarked for Westway could be better spent for an improv-
7. See generally A. TALBOT. SETTLING THINGS. SIX CASE STUDIES IN ENVIRONMENTAL MEDIATION
,1980). L. Lake. Mediating the West Side Highway Dispute in New York City, in ENVIRONMEN-
TAL MEDIATION. THE SEARCH FOR CONSENSUS (1980). A significant amount of my discussion of the
Storm King and Westway disputes is based on personal knowledge and experience
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ed mass transit system.
The groups opposed to, and those in favor of, Westway all ap-
peared to have a community of interest. They agreed that New York
City needed better mass transit and better roads. They agreed that
there were limited federal and state sources to fund these means
of transportation. It was not surprising that in 1974 an attempt
was made to mediate this ongoing dispute. A skilled mediator from
an established mediation organization was hired. The conveners
of the mediation invited a broad spectrum of proponents and op-
ponents to participate in the mediation process. The proponents
of the Westway project not only included representatives of the
various economic interests, but a substantial number of highly
qualified highway experts. The numerous opponents of the project
consisted primarily of community planning boards and citizens
groups interested in clean air, mass transit, and the impact of the
proposed project on their neighborhoods. A problem occurred when
a broad spectrum of individuals and groups were not invited or
chose not to participate in the mediation. These included the state's
governor and the city's mayor, both important decision makers.
Approximately thirty-eight individuals representing twenty-three
groups participated. The mediator was clearly recognized as a
neutral outsider, and not beholden to any group. Nevertheless, that
mediation, despite an apparent community of interest, failed to
resolve the dispute, which is still ongoing.8
The Westway effort should be contrasted with the major dispute
between Con Edison and nine other utilities along the Hudson
River. In 1979, the then Chairman of the Board of Con Edison
decided that matters had gone too far; the controversy had spread
from the proposed Storm King Project to the nuclear and coal fired
existing plants along the Hudson. The federal government wanted
the utilities to build giant cooling towers because the plant water
intakes were allegedly destroying the natural fisheiy of the Hud-
son. Some environmental groups were in favor of cooling towers,
some were opposed to them. Members of the state government op-
posed cooling towers because such towers would mar the beauty
of the Hudson River Valley. Eventually, there were nineteen par-
ties to this successful negotiation and mediation.
8. Sierra Club v. United States Army Corp of Engineers, Nos. 85-6297, 85-6299 (2d Cir.
Sept. 18, 1985) (available on LEXIS. Genfed library US App file) (upholding the district court's
denial of a landfill permit to continue Westway; and reversing the permanent injunction against
the project, remanding the matter to the federal agencies for appropriate action).
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Why did one mediation succeed while the other failed? It is
believed that the Westway negotiations failed because, despite his
impressive skills, the mediator was unable to obtain basic agree-
ment with respect to the fundamental data. Moreover, those pro-
ponents of Westway who were highway experts were perceived as
being unwilling to consider the "soft" policy issues advanced by
the project's opponents.
One commentator has observed:
The mediation experiment was an attempt to compensate for a faulty
participatory process. However, the agenda for the mediation group was
developed by the highway planners: it was an agenda of highway designs
developed by "professional high priests". It was not surprising then, that
the citizen intervenors were unprepared to select a highway design, and
instead wanted to discuss the equity of the interstate plan and social goals
which required a binding land-use plan. They found that in order to ad-
dress those goals they had to initiate litigation .... 9
Most importantly, it was perceived that the real parties in interest,
the governor and the mayor, were not at the negotiation table. Fur-
ther, the real estate interests, and some significant newer public
interest groups, were also absent from the table. Some of the peo-
ple who were at the table were primarily interested in the resolu-
tion of broad public issues and were not present because the road
would immediately impinge on their lives. They believed the law
should not permit this type of development and their presence was
to establish principles that would further the reduction of air pollu-
tion and congestion.
Another factor that apparently contributed to the Westway im-
passe was the perception on both sides that victory was attainable.
Westway proponents believed that the opponents of the project
were politically weak and would eventually have no input into the
decision. The Westway opponents realized their weakness but
believed they had enough power to block the project through delay.
The process was further exacerbated because there was no time
frame and no time pressure. No party faced a strike deadline or
commencement of a trial. Commentators have also suggested that
mediation will fail, as it did in the Westway project, when one par-
ty perceives that delay favors its position.
In the Storm King mediation, all parties believed that settle-
ment was needed and that time was running out. Fish were being
entrapped and killed; the government was going to move forward
9. L. LAKE. supra note 7, at 227.
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and require cooling towers; and there were ongoing administrative
proceedings.
The Storm King settlement was a major achievement. The par-
ties achieved their goals of protecting the environment and pro-
viding for the generation of electricity.10 The mediator was
Russell Train, former Undersecretary of Interior, judge, and ad-
ministrator of the Environmental Protection Agency. One reason
for the success of the mediation must be attributed to the stature
of the mediator and the respect he achieved from both the
regulated community and the environmentalists.
In his analysis of how settlement was accomplished, Train has
said that he made sure that he negotiated the ground rules first.
In certain settings such as industrial relations, the basic
framework for the negotiation is well established. Each side knows
who is on the opposite side of the table and what each wants. This
is not the case in environmental negotiations. It is often difficult
to discern not only who the parties are, but which negotiation pro-
cedures will be utilized.
One of the first things established by the mediator in the Storm
King dispute was that there would be no press releases or
statements to the media other than those made by the mediator.
Train also made sure that all parties who could affect a decision
were at the table, and that those at the table could speak for and
bind the groups they represented. Interestingly, Train found that
the government was the stumbling block, and the polarizing fac-
tor was the federal Environmental Protection Agency. It was dif-
ficult to get the government to come up with clean, tight decisions,
and assurances that its position during the mediation process
would be given effect.
A special and very important effort was made to adopt a com-
mon data base that could receive general agreement. Eventually,
parameters of commonly acceptable data and commonly accepted
areas of disagreement were negotiated. Finally, all parties, in-
cluding the generally intransigent government agency, displayed
a willingness to compromise, to make good faith offers, and to con-
sider counteroffers. This sustained and controlled negotiation pro-
cess led to a remarkable and much heralded settlement.
VI. LESSONS TO BE DRAWN FROM ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTES
I would like to draw from these examples the factors necessary
10. See A. TALBOT. supra note 7.
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to achieve a negotiated settlement in such complex disputes. It is
not difficult to mediate a dispute where two people want to settle
a matter which both sides understand and can reduce to
manageable terms. If one can get the parties in the same room, they
will work things out. However, it is a task of a different magnitude
when the facts are complex and there are strong interests com-
peting for diverse solutions. In this latter category, it is important
to have a competent mediator whom the parties regard as neutral.
A mediator is necessary because many disputes of a public nature
do not have a well-defined format, and there is a need for a neutral
party to start, structure, and control the negotiating process.
An environmental mediator must often do a considerable
amount of pre-negotiation leg-work. The reputation that the
mediator brings to the process will be of great assistance at this
point. The mediator's initial task may be to ensure that all the par-
ties who can influence the decision are at the conference table The
negotiation of environmental and similar public disputes is often
complicated because of the absence of critical parties from the
bargaining table. A collorary of this problem is that the parties pre-
sent may not be truly representative of their constituencies and
will be unable to deliver once the deal is struck. These problems
arise from the unstructured nature of environmental disputes, and
often from the amorphous nature of the disputants. Careful atten-
tion and time must be allocated to these problems by the
negotiating parties and the mediator. Efforts must be made to
bring in the missing parties, or to structure the settlement to
minimize disruptions from the missing parties.
The mediator must be assured that all parties will abide by the
ground rules that are established. The ability of the negotiating
representative to deliver on the commitment of the represented
group after a deal has been completed should be explored and
tested prior to the completion of negotiations. Representatives of
amorphous or bureaucratically structured organizations should
be given sufficient time to conduct their internal vertical
negotiations.
There are certain prerequisites to a successful negotiation that
transcend the need for a competent mediator and may only become
apparent to the parties through the assistance of a skillful neutral
party. As indicated above, an important prerequisite to successful
negotiation is the perception of the parties that they lack the
unilateral ability to affect the outcome of the dispute without in-
curring great costs. A necessary role of the mediator is the relative-
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ly limited one of helping a party recognize some of the real costs
it faces if the matter is not resolved through negotiation. This is
often the case in environmental disputes, where parties may be
unaware of relatively new environmental statutes and their
judicially enforced constraints. Environmental conflicts, like other
public disputes, are often between established groups that are un-
willing to recognize the threat posed by ad hoc groups advocating
new concepts. Certain parties simply may not be interested in
resolution, and there may be no incentive for them to participate
in a process which has as its objective a negotiated resolution to
the dispute The mediator may wish to isolate such participants
from the mainstream of the proceedings. It is difficult to conceive
of a successful negotiation where major participants see fewer
benefits in a settlement than in no settlement.
Another important requisite in achieving a negotiated settle-
ment is that the parties must stop talking about their positions
and start talking about their interests. In environmental disptites
there is often a knee-jerk reaction to espouse the company line.
The mediator should assist the parties to focus on their real in-
terests, and then see if these interests can be matched. The
mediator may attempt to accomplish these last two objectives in
separate meetings with the parties.
Once these two requisites have been met, the mediator can pro-
ceed with other important tasks that will lead to a negotiated solu-
tion. It is axiomatic that the mediator must attempt to build trust
between the negotiating parties. That is a very important task in
resolving disputes such as those involving environmental issues,
when the parties may have a long tradition of mutual suspicion
and distrust. The skilled mediator will encourage the parties to
make intermediate concessions that will assist in the building of
trust.
The inequality of information is particularly relevant to
disputes involving complex or scientific facts. Environmental
disputes are often characterized by one side controlling the
technical data. Where the environmental problem is not particular-
ly complex, or the competing party has comparable resources to
produce the needed data, this unequal distribution of power is
lessened. However, in many environmental disputes, data can on-
ly be obtained at great expense and scientifically analyzed at even
greater expense. The party with control of data has the power to
unilaterally influence the dispute. This party is often reluctant to
share such data with an adversary because it would create the
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equalization of power and would decrease the ability to unilateral-
ly affect the dispute. This often means that the governmental agen-
cy, the project developer, or the member of the regulated communi-
ty may continue to have superior power.
Inequality of power does not lend itself to a negotiated settle-
ment because it discourages the party with power to avoid mean-
ingful negotiations, and works against the building of mutual
trust. A major task of the mediator is to deal with this inequality
of information, and in effect, inequality of power. A careful distinc-
tion should be made between the sharing of data and the reveal-
ing of expert testimony. A party should not be expected to reveal
the latter category of information. The trade-off for revealing base
data may be the agreement of the other side to reveal its objections
to the validity of the data. The party with the data must under-
stand that the price of a negotiated settlement may involve conces-
sions of information held by that party. This may require the
mediator to structure interim settlements on the pooling of
information.
Parties must also reach agreement regarding basic facts. The
parties may choose to disagree on the probable consequence of
those facts, but unless they can agree on some baseline, the pros-
pects for settlement will be small. The mediator must take par-
ticular care to ensure that the negotiators do not become captive
audiences to competing experts. The presentations of the techni-
cians and experts should be carefully controlled. In analagous in-
stances, caution has been advised against the impulse to give an
unfettered choice among competing policies "greater sanctity by
embodying it in the seeming objectivity of an 'expert discipline "I'
A final lesson which can be drawn from environmental disputes
is that the mediator must be respected by all parties. All parties
must believe in the mediator's impartiality. A successful en-
vironmental mediator must be able to diffuse the legacy of the
revolution - a distrust of the other party's motivations.
VII. CONCLUSION
I hope that these comments are useful and that there is agree-
ment that mediation and negotiation arising from different fields
have certain common prerequisites. The lessons gleaned from the
environmental area do have application to most other areas of
11. L. JAFFEE. JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 580 (1965).
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dispute resolution. Above all, it must be understood that the pro-
cess of mediation in difficult situations such as environmental con-
flict is not mechanics, but art.

